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ABSTRACT
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixed price regulation in
a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm can endogenously quali-
ty discriminate. The motivation for this analysis is the current move of
third party payors (governmental and private insurors) toward prospective
pricing of medical services. Our major result is that prospective pricing
causes a distributional welfare loss. Specifically, in our model, prospective
pricing induces a profit maximizing medical care provider to simultaneously
provide a smaller than socially optimal level of quality to more severely ill
patients and, surprisingly, a greater than socially optimal amount of quality
to less severely ill patients. Further, the distributional welfare loss does
not disappear when ethically motivated deviation from profit maximization is
allowed.
The inefficient distribution of quality occurs because prospective payment
regulation fixes the price across patients with different seventies of ill-
ness but allows providers to quality discriminate. More complicated DRG pric-
ing rules do not appear to be able to completely avoid this problem. Alterna-
tively, vertical integration of third party payors into the direct provision
of medical care is shown to be able to bypass the problem completely. This
implies that the recent proliferation of vertically integrated health care or-
ganizations such health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organi-
zations, and managed care plans by self—insuring employers are welfare improv-
ing.
Robin Allen Paul Gertler
US Department of Justice Department of Health Policy
Anti—Trust Division and Management
Judiciary Center Building Harvard School of Public Health
555 4th Street, NW 677 Huntington Avenue
Washington, DC 20001 Boston, MA 02115I. INTRODUCTION
This paper analyzes the welfare implications of fixedprice regulation in
a model in which consumers are heterogenous and a firm canendogenously quali-
ty discriminate. The motivation for this analysis is the currentrapid move
to prospective pricing of medical services. In 1987 the Medicareprogram,
which is the largest purchaser of healthcare services in the United States,
began paying hospitals a completely prospectively determined fixed feeper
patient.1 In addition, many state Medicaidprograms and private insurors have
instituted comparable payment systems, andmany of the others are actively
considering implementing one. Also, several state Medicaidprograms, such as
New York's, are using a similar method topay for nursing home care, and ex-
tension of the system to physician services isactively being considered by
Medicare and many state Medicaid programs.
The move to prospective pricing is inresponse to the enormous growth in
health care (and in particular, hospital) expendituresas a result of
retrospective reimbursement of "reasonable costs" and theaccompanying high
costs of administration.2 Cost based reimbursementprovided little incentive
for health care providers to efficiently produce medicalcare as costs could
usually be passed on to the third party payor. In contrast,prospective pay-
mentprovides incentive for the efficient (minimum cost) production of medical
services by allowing providers to keep the difference between theprice and
1See Vladeck (1984) for a complete description of Medicare'sprospective
payment program.
2 See Schweiker (1982) for a discussion of the rationale usedby U.S. De-
partment of Health and Human Services to push for prospectivepricing.2
variable costs.3 Further, prospective pricing substantially reduces adminis-
trative costs by removing the necessity of annual audits of each hospital's
financial statement, and the monitoring of the reasonableness of each
patient's bill.
Medicare's prospective payment system pays hospitals a fixed fee per
patient depending upon which of the approximately 470 "diagnosis related
groups" (DRCs) the patient is placed. Once placed in a DRG, the fee is inde-
pendent of the services (e.g. number of hospitalized days, number of tests,
etc.) provided the patient. The services provided each patient are the qual-
ity characteristics of hospital care. Hospital services (quality) are typi-
cally tailored to the medical needs of the individual patient (Harris, 1977).
Empirical work in Berki (1984), Horn et. al. (1983,1985), and Stern and Ep-
stein (1985) show great variation in severity of illness within DRC
categories, implying substantial patient heterogeneity and potential for qual-
ity discrimination. In suirilnary, the DRG payment structure fixes the price
across patient severity of illness types within DRGs, while allowing medical
care providers to quality discriminate (i.e. provide different levels of qual-
ity to different patients).
The concern voiced most often about prospective pricing is that it may
have an adverse effect on health (i.e. patients will leave hospitals "quicker
and sicker"). In models with heterogenous consumers and exogenous quality,
Dranove (1986) and Newhouse (1983) argue that prospective payment is an incen—
3Shleifer (1985) also shows that setting prices based on the average cost
of a pool of comparable firms is incentive to choose the cost minimizing level
of capital stock.3
tive for providers not to admit (transfer) severely ill patients thatare
likely to be very costly to treat. In a model with endogenous quality anda
fixed number of patients (i.e. exogenous quantity), Ellis and McGuire(1986)
argue that prospective payment improves efficiency incentives but may also in-
duce providers to reduce quality.
All of these models place strong restrictions on the demand function.Be-
cause providers cannot adjust quality in Dranove's and Newhouse's models, the
choice set of providers is limited to refusing to treat (i.e.transfer)
patients. In essence, quality becomes a binary variable; treating thepatient
in a high quality hospital or transferring to a low quality hospital.Even
though Ellis and McGuire consider endogenous quality, by making quantityex
ogenous they do not allow quality choices to affect the number of patients a
provider attracts and thus eliminate any role for a market for patients.
This paper extends previous analysis by combining consumerheterogeneity,
endogenous quality, and endogenous quantity into one model. We show thata
DRG pricing structure induces a distributional welfare loss.Specifically, in
our model, a profit maximizing provider simultaneously supplies a smaller than
socially optimal amount of quality to more severely ill patients, andsur-
prisingly, a greater than socially optimal quality to less severely ill
patients. The ratio of patients who are over—supplied quality to those who
are under—supplied increases with the price.
In addition, these results do not disappear when we allowethically
motivated deviation from profit maximization. We show that such deviation
induces providers to reduce the degree of under—provision ofquality to more
severely ill patients without reducing the over—provision of quality to less4
severely ill patients. Indeed, even if providers are perfect agents for
patients, they still over—provide quality to the less severely ill patients
while providing the optimal amount of quality to the more severely ill. In
most cases, ethically motivated providers are able to supply the ethical
amount of quality to the more severely ill patients only by cross—subsidizing
their care with the profits from the treatment of the less severely ill.
Finally, we discuss several possible solutions to this distributional
welfare problem. The most promising one appears to be vertical integration of
medical care providers with third party payors and insurors. This implies
that recent innovations in the health care market such as health maintenance
organizations, preferred provider organizations, and managed care plans by
self—insuring employers are welfare improving.
II. BEHAVIORAL ASSTJNPTIONS AND NOTATION
Individuals seek medical care in response to an illness or accident and
for preventive (investment) purposes. The quality of medical care is its ex-
pected efficacy (marginal product) in terms of health. The greater the flow
of medical services provided to an individual, the higher is quality. The
consumption of medical services is assumed to improve an individual's stock of
health, but at a diminishing rate (i.e. a positive and diminishing marginal
productivity of medical care services).
The productivity of medical services depends on the complexity and
severity of the medical problem. The more severe and complex the problem, the
greater the marginal productivity of medical services. Let 8 measure the com-
plexity and severity of illness.5
A provider's demand from the group of individuals with illness type 0 is
X —X(P,Q;9), (1)
where X is the number of patients, P is the price charged each patient, and Q
is the quality (flow of medical services) provided each patient. The demand
function is assumed to be decreasing in price (X ￿0),increasing in quality
(XQ0), and due to a diminishing marginal productivity of medical care, con-
cave in quality (X ￿0).We also assume that individuals are less sensitive
to price changes for higher quality medical care (X 0).
Since the value of medical care rises with severity of illness, the pro-
portion of potential patients within a 6 group that purchase care rises with
the severity and complexity of illness, holding price and quality constant.
On the other hand, the density of potential patients in an 6 group declines
rapidly with severity and complexity of illness. The decline in density is
likely to offset the increase in the proportion of potential patients seeking
care, so that demand is likely to be approximately constant over 9 types,
holding price and quality constant. Therefore, the demand functions are as-
sumed to be constant in 9 (X8 =0).In addition, more severely ill individu-
als are assumed to have higher marginal values of quality, so that the demand
function is more quality elastic (X 0) and less price elastic (X90) for
more severe illness types.
Finally,the cost of supplying quality level Q to X patients is
CcXQ, (2)6
where c is the marginal cost of a unit of quality. The cost function, as
specified in (2), exhibits constant returns to scale. The constant returns to
scale assumption is consistent with hospital cost function estimates reported
in Friedman and Pauly (1981). This assumption is extremely useful in that it
implies that the profit and welfare maximization problems are separable in 6,
and therefore can be considered separately for each 0 type. This makes the
problem amenable to standard calculus and bypasses the necessity of solving
the more complicated optimal control problem.
III. THE FIRST—BEST
The social optimum is found by choosing price and quality to maximize the
sum of consumer surplus and profits. Price and quality are allowed to vary by
illnesstype. Since the cost function exhibits constant returns to scale, the
social welfare function is separable by illness type. The social welfare
function for illness type 0 is
W 5X(v,Q;O)dv +PX(P,Q;0)—cX(P,Q;9)Q, (3)





which reduce to the more familiar conditions,
PcQ (6)
(jXQdv)/X —c. (7)
Condition(6) requires price to be equal to the marginal cost of an additional
patient, and condition (7) requires the marginal contribution of quality to
average consumer surplus to equal the unit marginal cost of quality.
One implication of this model is that the welfare maximizing quality pro-
vided each patient monotonically increases for more severely ill patient
types. Formally, by applying Cramer's rule to the first—order conditions in
(4) and (5)





whereQ* is the welfare maximizing level of quality.4 The denominator of (8)
is the determinant of the hessian of the welfare maximization problem, divided
by X. Since the determinant of the hessian is positive at the maximum and X,






From(4), andrecalling that (4)requiresP—cQ,W—0and —X,.￿ 0.
From (5), and recalling that P —cQand X9 —0, WQ9 —SXQ8dv, w
dv, and — — — cXi,￿ 0. Substitution of these expressions into dQ*/dO
and distributing out a X, in both the denominator and the numerator yields
(8).8
is negative, the denominator of (8) is negative. The numeratoris also nega-
tive as result of 0, implying that (8) is positive.
This result follows from patients' marginal value of quality (andhence
marginal consumers' surplus) increasing with severityof illness. Individuals
with greater seventies of illness are willing to pay morefor higher quality.
As a result, the welfare maximizing amount of qualityis larger for more
severely ill patients.
IV. DR.G PRICE REGULATION
Under DRG price regulation, one fixed price is set for a rangeof illness
types, and by law must accept the DRG price as paymentin full. The provider
is assumed to take the price as given, but is allowed to supply adifferent
level of quality to individuals of different illness types. No matterhow the
price is chosen, the provider chooses quality so as tomaximize profits.
Therefore, the following results are valid for the second—best policy,where
the DRG price is chosen to maximize welfare subject to the provider choosing
quality to maximize profits.
Let P be the price for the DRG comprised of illness types 0 through&.
Sincethe cost function exhibits constant returns to scale, the profitfunc-
tion is separable by illness type, and for illness type 8 is
11PX(P,Q;6) —cX(P,Q;9)Q, (9)9
The profit maximizing quality for patients of type 9 is given by the condition
l•I —(P—
cQ)XQ—cX—0, (10)
which requires the marginal revenue from quality to equal marginal cost.
As in the first—best case, the profit maximizing level of quality
monotonically increases with severity of illness. Formally, by applying
Cramer's rule to (10) and a little manipulation
dQ —(P—




whereQ is the profit maximizing level of quality. The denominator is fl
and, by the second order conditions, must be negative at the maximum. The
numerator is also negative as XQ6 > 0, implying that (11)ispositive.
This result is obtained because consumers' marginal value of quality, and
therefore the marginal revenue from quality is greater for higher more severe-
ly ill patient types. As a result, a profit maximizing provider supplies more
quality to patients in the higher 9 markets than in the smaller 9 markets.
The profit maximizing level of quality for each 9 type also increases
with price. By applying Cramer's rule to (10) and a little manipulation
dQ —[(P—
cQ)XQ—




The denominator of (12) is the same as the denominator of (11), and is there-
fore negative. The numerator is also negative as a result of ￿ 0 and X, ￿
0, implying that (12) is positive. This result occurs because a higher price
implies a higher marginal revenue from quality, and therefore profitmaximiz-
ing providers supply more quality to each 0 market as theDRC price rises.
V. DEVIATION FROM THE FIRST—BEST FOR A GIVEN SEVERITY TYPE
A profit maximizing provider facing DRO price regulation may supply
patients of a given illness group a level of quality higher or lowerthan the
first—best depending on the value of the DRC price. Further, by paying a
premium, the regulator can induce a provider to supply the first—best quality
to a particular 9 group, but not to all 9 groups. Another way to state this
result is that for a particular price, there exists a 9 group to which the
profit maximizing provider supplies the first—best quality and the associated
first—best price is less than the DRG price.
These results are easily demonstrated in figure 1 where the first order
welfare maximizing and first—order profit maximizing conditions are pictured
for a given 9 group. The WQ=O and W0 lines represent all the combinations
of price and quality that satisfy the welfare maximizing conditions (4) and
(5) for a given 9 group. These lines are upward sloping with WQ'O being
steeper than W=0.5 Their intersection gives the welfare maximizing priceand
5By the implicit function theorer the slopes of and WQO are
dP/dQ —WQ/Wand dP/dQ —— W/WQp,respectively. The second order condi-
tions require W ￿ 0 and ￿ 0. From (4) and (5) and recalling that (4) re-
quires P —cQ,W — — —cXi,0. Therefore, W—0 and WQ=O are both upward
sloping, and the second order condition, WW —WWc￿ 0, implies that WQO
is steeper than W=0.11
quality, {p*(9),Q*(9)], for individuals with severity of illness type 8.
The TI-.O line in figure 1 represents all the combinations of price and
quality that satisfy the profit maximizing condition (11) for a given 8 group.
It is upward sloping and everywhere to the left of the WQ=O line.6 Being
everywhere to the left of WQO follows from fl-O being satisfied at a lower
quality for each price.7 Given the DRG price, the profit maximizing quality
Q(6) supplied individuals with severity type 9 is read off the IIO line.
The relationship between the profit maximizing and welfare maximizing
levels of quality depends on the value of the DRG price. If the DRG price
equals P in figure 1, then the profit maximizing quality level equals the
welfare maximizing quality level. Notice that a preiniun-i of P —Pmust be
paid in order to induce the profit maximizing provider to supply the welfare
maximizing level of quality. If the DRG price is larger than P (say P' in
figure 1), then the profit maximizing level of quality is larger than the
welfare maximizing level. If the DRG price is set below P (say P° in figure
1), then the profit maximizing level of quality is lower the welfare maximiz-
ing level.
As shown in figure 1, the members of illness group 8 receive the welfare
maximizing level of quality from a profit maximizing provider if the DRG price
6By the implicit function theorem the slope of fl-.O is dP/dQ —— fl/fl.
The second order conditions require fl ￿ 0, and from (10)flQ —(P—
CQ)XQp cX 0, both of which imply that II—O is upward sloping.
7This easily demonstrated by comparing the profit maximizingII —0condi-
tion in (10) with the welfare maximizing condition WQ —0in (5) and noting
that (5) can be expressed as WQ —jXQdv+ UQ —0.The expression j.Qdv is
positive, implying that (5) is satisfied at a higher Qthanis (10) for the
same values of P and 8.12
is set at P.It does not necessarily follow that other illness types will
also receive the welfare maximizing quality when the DRG price is set at P.
Specifically, the WQO, W—O, and IL,—O lines are located in different posi-
tions for different 8 types so that Q(8) 'Q*(8)for other U types. This
point is explored in detail in the next section.
VI. DEVIATION FRO14 THE FIRST BEST BY SEVERITY TYPE
Under DRC price regulation, profit maximizing providers supply a level of
quality lower than the first—best to more severely ill patients, and a level
of quality higher than the first—best to less severely ill patients.8 This
result is presented in figure 2a where the first best quality function Q*(9)
and the profit maximizing quality function Q(9) are pictured. The functions
are pictured for one DRG which spans the range [6',]. Both functions have
already been shown to be monotonically increasing in e. The Q*(9) function is
steeper than the Q(8) function, and intersects Q(9) at.Aprofit maximizing
provider supplies patients with severity of illness less than with a greater
than socially optimal level of quality, and supplies patients with severity of
illness greater than with a less than socially optimal amount of quality.9
The difference between Q(6) and Q*(9) is the amount of quality that is over-
supplied (or under—supplied) to patients of illness type 8. Note that the
difference is decreasing in 8.
8Proof of this result is proved in the appendix
9There is no guarantee that the Q*(6) line will intersect the Q(6) line in
he [O,6J range as is pictured in figure 2a. This depend on the valueof
P. As we argue later, the way in which Medicare chooses P makes it likely
that the two functions will cross in the relevant range.13
The under— and over—provision of quality is a result of DRCregulation
restricting the price to be the same across severity types. Under—provision
occurs because, unlike the first—best where more severely ill patientspay
more for greater quality, providers cannot by law receive higherpayments for
higher quality. The relatively low regulated price induces providers tosupp-
ly a lower than first—best quality to more severely ill types, when in fact,
these patients would prefer a higher quality at a higher price. Over—
provision occurs because providers find the DRG payment very lucrative for
less severely ill patients. The relatively high regulatedprice induces pro-
viders to supply a higher than first—best level of quality toattract more of
these patients, even though these patients would prefera lower quality at a
lower price.
A related result is that proportion of patients beingover—supplied
quality increases with price (i.e. the 0 at which Q*(9) equals Q(9) is in-
creasing in F). In (12) we demonstrated that the profit maximizing level of
quality for each 6 is increasing in price. Therefore, an increase inF, to
say F', shifts the Q(9) line upwards to Q'(9) as is pictured in figure 2b. At
the new price Q*(9) equals Q'(8) at 9' >. Consequently,patients types be-
tween 6 and 6' switch from being under—supplied quality tobeing over-
supplied.
Further, there exists a price above which all patients within the DRC
(i.e. BE[#,J) are over—supplied quality, and another below which all
patients are under—supplied quality. It is probable that current DRCprices
are within the range in which the Q*(9) line crosses the Q(9) line in the
range [9,6], so that some patients are always under—supplied quality and14
other are always over—supplied quality. The reason for this is that the DRC
prices are set based on the average costs of a large pooi of comparable hospi-
tals.10 The prices reflect the (inefficient) costs associated with the quali-
ty provided to the average 9 under the old cost based payment system.Since
the prices are greater than the cost of efficiently providing quality to the
average 9, the prices are high enough so that some less severelyill patients
are being over—supplied quality. In addition, some patients will be under—
supplied quality as there are always a few very severely ill patients who are
outliers in the illness distribution within each DRG.
VII. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CROSS—SUBSIDIZATION
Even though proprietary hospital chains are rapidly expanding their
market shares, it is not clear that all medical care providers can be modeled
strictly as profit maximizers. Indeed Pauly (1980) and Ellis and McGuire
(1986) stress the role of the physician as a patient's agent, and the conflict
between ethical considerations for the patients' welfare and their own profit
(income) maximization. In this section we show that ethically motivated
deviation from profit maximization causes medical care providers to use prof-
its from the care of less severely ill patients to cross—subsidize the care of
more severely ill patients. This cross—subsidization nioves the quality of
care closer to the first—best for more severely ill patients but does not af-
fect the over—provision of quality to less severely ill patients.
10 The pool is constructed to be large enough so that no hospital's actions
can significantly influence the pool average costs.15
Ethical considerations are introduced by means of a minimum quality con-
straint. The provider is ethically bound to provide patients at least some
percentage of the first—best quality, where this percentage is assumed to be
constant over all 0 types. This is represented in figure 3a by the Qe(9)
line, which is parallel to Q*(0), the first—best quality function. Patients
with severity of illness types greater then rinfigure 3a receive an in-
crease in quality from the Q(9) line to the Q(0) line. Patients with
severity less than 0e are unaffected by the constraint as the profit maximiz-
ing quality for them is higher the ethical minimum.
If the minimum quality constraint introduces negative profits for the
patients with severity greater than 0e, then their care must be cross—
subsidized with profits from the patients with severity less than geThis
notion of cross—subsidization is consistent with the industry complaint that
the actual costs incurred by hospitals in caring for very severely ill
patients are substantially greater than the DRG price.
If the provider is a perfect agent for patients, then the minimum quality
constraint Qe(0) is equal to the first—best quality function Q*(0), as is
pictured in figure 3b. In this case, patients with severity of illness
greater thanreceive the first—best quality, and patients with severity less
thanreceive the profit maximizing level of quality given by the Q(0) line.
Hence, even when providers are perfect agents, they still over—supply quality
to the less severely ill.16
VIII. DRG REFOR}!
Aslong as there is severity of illness heterogeneity and endogenous
quality discrimination within DRG categories, it will be difficult to find a
pricing rule that provides the socially optimal quality and promotes ef-
ficiency. One obvious means of reducing the within DRG severity of illness
variation is to create more DRG categories. A prominent proposal, suggested
by Horn et. al. (1985), would effectively increase in the number of DRGs five
fold. The creation of more categories would seriously aggravate the already
costly problem of monitoring hospitals to prevent the spurious reclassifica—
tion of patients into more lucrative DRGs (DRG creep). Alternatively, Dranove
(1986) and Shleifer (1985) suggest letting the price depend on exogenous
sources of cost variation across providers such as severity of illness. Of
course, the validity of this approach requires quality to be exogenous.
Another approach, suggested in Ellis and McGuire (1986), is to let the
DRG price be a linear function of the cost of the individual patient's care.
As long as the slope parameter is less than one, this structure maintains the
efficiency incentives of the fixed rate prospective payment while allowing the
price to vary by patient type. Although not perfect, this type of pricing
rule may induce providers to supply a quality schedule closer to the first—
best. The proposal is problematic in that the informational requirements
necessary to implement it are huge as it doubles the number of DRG parameters
that must be chosen. The choice of optimal parameters is even more difficult
than in the usual principle—agent setting, as ethical deviation from profit
maximization and moral hazard incentives introduced by the existence of medi-
cal care insurance must be incorporated into the problem. In addition, an in—17
centive scheme which is a linear function of costs puts Medicare back in the
costly business of auditing hospital financial statements and monitoring
patient bills, and there is still the issue of preventing DRC creep.
In sum, these methods of "fine tuning" the DRG payment scheme will proba-
bly improve economic efficiency somewhat, but at the expense of reintroducing
substantial administrative burden to regulatory agencies. This seems to
defeat one of the major reasons for switching from retrospective cost based
reimbursement to DRC style prospective payment. Therefore, rather than devot-
ing further work to analyzing the relative merits of these fine tuning
proposals, we consider in the next section how recent invovations in the in-
dustry have the potential for the efficient distribution of quality with litle
adminstrative cost.
IX. VERTICAL INTEGRATION
There are two fundenniental incentive problems for third party payors (go—
verrirnental and private insurors)in the health care industry: (1) the optimal
design of medical care insurance for consumers which is comnplicated by the
familiar problems of moral hazard and advrese selection and (2) the optimal
design of provider payment schemes which is the focus of this paper. On the
provider side, an inefficient distribution of quality arises from the in-
ability of third party payors to use price incentives to induce medical care
providers to implement a first—best quality schedule. The difficulty arises
due to the conflicting incentives facing third party payors and medical care
providers. Insurors cannot ex ante offer prospective subscribers the first—
best quality schedule because they only imperfectly control providers' quality18
schedules, Q(9), through ex post incentives embedded in the methods they use
to pay providers. Therefore, competition in the insurance market could at
best induce insurors to offer the second—best quality schedule, Q(9).
A natural reaction to a competitive insurance market is for insurors to
vertically integrate into the direct provision of health care. Vertically in-
tegrated insuror—providers who are able to offer the first—best quality sched-
ule Q*(9), have a competitive advantage. Indeed, vertically integrated
insuror—providers such as health maintenance organizations, preferred provider
organizations, and managed care plans by self—insuring employers are
proliferating throughout the health care industry. Unlike the uniritegrated
market, competition in a market of vertically integrated insuror—providers
could induce the first—best quality schedule. Indeed, the market for health
insurance is becoming substantially more competitive with the emergence of
health maintenance organizations, preferred provider organizations and managed
care plans by self—insuring employers.
Vertical integration of third party payors and providers removes the
necessity of imperfect regulatory pricing of providers, and therefore, in com-
bination with a competitive market for insurance mitigates the type of dis-
tributional welfare losses discussed here. The familiar problems in designing
optimal insurance are still present, but are no longer complicated by the im-
perfect control of providers by third party payors.19
X. CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this paper is point out some of the difficulties and com-
plexities that patient severity of illness heterogeneity and endogenous quali-
ty discrimination add to the medical care provider pricing problem. Our major
result is that DRG style prospective pricing causes a distributional welfare
loss. Specifically, it induces medical care providers to simultaneously pro-
vide a smaller than socially optimal level of quality to more severely ill
patients and, surprisingly, a greater than socially optimal amount of quality
to less severely patients. This inefficient distribution of quality occurs
because DRG price regulation fixes the price across patients with different
seventies of illness. More complicated DRC pricing rules do not appear to be
able to completely avoid this problem.
Vertical integration of third party payors into the direct provision of
medical care may be a solution to this problem. In an unintegrated market the
first—best quality schedule in unavailable to insurors. They can at best of-
fer potential subscribers the second—best quality schedule that results from
the imperfect control of providers through incentives embedded in payment me-
chanisms. With vertical integration the first—best quality schedule is avail-
able to insurors, and therefore, there is no longer a need to design second—
best provider payment schemes. Competition among vertically integrated
insuror—providers can induce the provision of the first—best quality to
patients in every illness group. Thus, the recent proliferation of vertically
integrated health care organizations such health maintenance organizations,
preferred provider and managed care plans by self insuring employers are wel-
fare improving.20
APPENDIX
This appendix provides proof of the proposition that a profit maximizing
provider supplies a lower than socially optimal level of quality to more
severely ill patients and a greater than socially optimal level of quality to
more severely ill patients. This proposition is illustrated in figure 2a.
Since both Q*(O) and Q(8) have already been shown to be monotonically increas-
ing in B (see sections III and IV respectively), this proposition is proven by
demonstrating that the slope of Q*(9) is everywhere greater than the slope of
Q(9) (i.e. showing that (8) is greater than (11)). In sections V and VI, we
established that, for a reasonable range of prices, there exists at least one
5e[O,] where Q*(9) equals Q(). Let any severity type at which the two
functions are equal be denoted by .Ifthe slope of Q*(9) is greater than
the slope of Q(&) at each ,thenQ*(9) crosses Q(O) only once and is every-
where steeper than Q(9).
Demonstrating that (8) is greater than (11) at anyis made easier by
rearranging (8). By (6), cQ can substituted into (8) for P. Then, assuming
that third order derivatives of the demand function are negligible, we can
write (8) as





wherea is defined by X(a,Q;6)—0 for the Q and 6 at which (13) is evaluated.
Now we show that (13) is larger than (11) at 0. We have already estab-
lished that at ,Q*equals Q and P is less than P. Since Q and 0 are21
identical and third order derivatives of the demand function are assumed to be
negligible, the values of cQ, X, and are the same in (11) and (13). The
additional result that P is less than P along with our demand function as-
sumption X ￿ 0, implies that 2cXQ is smaller in (13) than in (11). Since
2cXQ is in the denominators of (11) and (13), this difference acts so as to
make (13) larger than (11).
The denominators of (11) and (13) are both negative. The first two ternis
in the denominators of both expressions are identical expect that P in (11) is
replaced with a >Pin (13). The third term in the denominator of (13) has no
counterpart in (11). This term, (— is positive, and its addition to
the denominator of (13), the rest of which is negative, acts to increase (13)
relative to (11).
The remaining difference between (11) and (13) is that P in (11) is r—
placed with a > P in (13). If P equalled a, then, based on our results so
far, (13) would be bigger than (11). Therefore, since (11) can be shown to be
increasing in P and (13) can be shown to be increasing in a, a larger than P
implies that (13) is larger than (11).22
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